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2 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARTIN

SUBJECT: Briefing to Net Evaluation Subcommittee

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- 1. The purpose of the presentation on "The Air Force Concept of Operations in the 1962 Time Period For Unrestricted Global War" to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) is twofold:
- a. First, orientation for General Hickey and other new staff members on the Subcommittee. It General Hickey (Army) has been recalled from retired status to replace General Thomas (Marines) as the Subcommittee Chief, in January 1959. In all probability General Thomas will not attend the presentation. General Smith (Air Force), Deputy Chief of the Subcommittee, will attend.
- b. Second, to assist the Subcommittee in their war gaming exercise for the 1962 period. Since this war gaming for the mid-range period is done on a yearly basis, the subcommittee desires the latest Service thinking on concepts of operations. The Army and Navy will present their briefings subsequent to the Air Force briefing.
- 2. A 30-minute briefing has been prepared and will be presented in Room 5E 229, at 0930 hours on 3 December 1958. It is desired that you or General Wheless make a few opening remarks and be available at the termination of the briefing in the event of questions from members of the Subcommittee. A proposed brief opening statement is attached at Inclosure 1.
- 1 Incl Opening Remarks

BRIAN S. GUNDERSON Lt Colonel, USAF

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General Hickey, Gentlemen:


It is always a privilege to speak to this particular gathering. I am especially pleased that the topic for discussion is "The Air Force Concept of Operations in the 1962 Time Period for Unrestricted Global War".

Looking into the future and developing proper concepts has always been important, but never so vital to survival as it is today. I know that your group is constantly working towards the future and for the defense of our country and we in the Air Force appreciate the fine contributions you have made to our common security and welfare.

The key to the success of our common effort is, I believe, the ability to visualize the early 60's in sufficiently sharp focus so that we can determine and concentrate -- now -- on the military concepts and strategies we need for the future. To obtain this perspective requires judgment, a solid background of fact and a capacity to evaluate.

The presentation by Lt Colonel Gunderson which follows should give you that solid background of fact.

Colonel Gunderson



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PRESENTATION TO NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE (NESC)
"AIR FORCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 1962 TIME PERIOD FOR
UNRESTRICTED GLOBAL WAR"
LT COLONEL BRIAN S. GUNDERSON
ROOM 5E 229, THE PENTAGON
0930 HOURS, 3 DECEMBER 1958

General Thomas, General Hickey, Gentlemen:

It is my pleasure to discuss with you the strategy and concept of operations for the employment of U.S. Air Forces in the 1962 time period for unrestricted global war.

In a general war of the future, the Western Hemisphere <u>must</u> expect to be the first and most important target. Never before have we faced a situation in which catastrophic damage could be inflicted on our nation in a matter of <u>hours</u> and even <u>minutes</u>. With the acceptance of this fact, we must recognize that no mobilization in the pattern of World Wars I and II will be possible. The consequences of an oversight or a failure of alertness or communications; or most important, a lagging decision which brings about a delay in reaction time may well cripple our own striking power and produce a situation from which there could be no recovery.

It is in recognition of these facts that the Air Force has adopted and is advocating at all levels of strategic planning and policy-making, this concept for the future. The Air Force holds that:

(CHART #1 ON)

- l. The initial phase of general war, of relatively short duration, will be characterized by an intensive exchange of nuclear weapons, during which each side will seek to obliterate the other's ability to deliver additional weapons.
- 2. The subsequent phase of general war will be of indeterminate duration and will be characterized by those exploitation operations which can be conducted with residual forces to obtain the collapse of remaining enemy resistance.
 - 3. The opportunity or

3. The opportunity or ability to mobilize after total war is upon us will not exist. It follows that the forces required to gain a favorable decision during the critical initial phase must be in being and at the peak of combat-readiness prior to D-Day. Furthermore, these forces must be poised to strike instantly.

(CHART #1 OFF)

I should like to emphasize that the Air Force does not preach a philosophy of short war. We do not attempt to predict the duration of World War III. It is anybody's guess as to how long the over-all war will last. We do believe, however, that the <u>initial phase</u> will be short, <u>intensive</u> and <u>decisive</u>, and our war plans <u>must</u> be geared to this concept. We cannot permit the Soviets to retain the capability to drop nuclear bombs at the time and place of their choosing and hope to survive ourselves. Air Force tasks, therefore, are somewhat different from those of the other Services, because we must be prepared to win the decisive phase — the air battle — within a period of days or even hours following the outbreak of a general war.


For Air Force planning, the Initial Phase is considered to extend from D-Day through the first month. U.S. Air Force operations will be directed to:


(CHART #2 ON)

- 1. Destruction of the enemy's capability to deliver nuclear weapons.
 - 2. Defense of the United States.
 - 3. Attainment of air superiority in critical areas.
 - 4. Containment of Soviet air-ground offensives.
 - 5. Destruction of Soviet war-sustaining facilities.
- 6. Isolation and elimination of deployed Soviet and Satellite military forces.

(CHART #2 OFF)

During the Initial





During the Initial Phase the Air Force will launch its strategic offensive, primarily with forces of the Strategic Air Command. The overall task of the strategic offensive force is the destruction of the Soviets war-making capability and the resources that support it. The most urgent task is the destruction of those targets which comprise the immediate threat to the United States.

Several target systems, which constitute the threat to the United States, have been advanced. Systems advocated vary from a few hundred to many thousands of targets. We have screened literally thousands of targets in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union and the Communist Rloc.

From this analysis, we estimate that the Soviet's war-making capability and the resources supporting this capability are contained in these categories of targets:

These are the targets that make up the Soviet nuclear delivery capability and the mechanism directing its employment:

(CHART #3 ON)

Bomber Bases and Missile Sites (Including On-base Weapon Storage and Logistic Support)

Government Control Centers

Aerospace Command and Control Centers


Air Defense Systems

Nuclear Weapons Storage Facilities

(CHART #3 OFF)

But we do not know, positively, whether destruction of these categories of targets will defeat the Soviets. Throughout their history, the Russians have displayed grim determination to absorb destruction - they suffered over 20,000,000 casualties during World War II. We believe it likely that other categories of targets will require successful attack

3



require successful attack before the Soviets are defeated. These categories are:

(CHART #4 ON)

Primary Ground and Naval Installations and Concentrations
Army and Navy Headquarters

POL and Logistic Support Centers

Other Military Airfields


Prime War Industries
(Including Nuclear Weapons Production)

(CHART #4 OFF)

As you know, preventive war is not an acceptable course of action for the United States. Many people believe that our absolute refusal to accept preventive war as a course of action means that we must suffer a surprise, direct and possibly massive and devastating attack before our strategic offensive force is launched. Although we have prepared and must continue to prepare ourselves for such a possibility, we must not lose sight of the fact that hostilities can be initiated under other circumstances.

This point is very pertinent to the Air Force targeting concept. There is very little disagreement with the Air Force's counter force targeting concept under the condition whereby the U.S. exercises the initiative. No one will argue the fact that the Soviet nuclear delivery and control mechanism are targets of the highest priority. The implications resulting from an inadequate attack on these targets could be so awesome that we cannot be conservative in our attack. The Air Force is of the firm belief that every segment of the Soviet's capability to deliver nuclear weapons on Allied territory must be destroyed and the resources to accomplish this objective must be available.

On the other hand.




On the other hand, the Air Force counter-force targeting concept under the condition whereby the U.S. has sustained a sizable surprise attack by the USSR is sometimes questioned. The questions that are usually raised are along the lines of: is it sensible to attack Soviet bomber bases while those bombers are enroute to or over the U.S.? The same question is asked in respect to ICBM launch sites. The logical answer to these questions is "No" if, in fact, the bombers and missiles have been launched from these targets and the bomber bases and missile sites will not be utilized again. The catch in this answer is, will we, in fact, know if the bombers and missiles have been launched from these targets and will we, in fact, know these facilities will not be utilized for a subsequent attack.

The problem of what precise USSR targets in the Sino Soviet Bloc will be attacked in a reaction to a surprise attack undoubtedly will be difficult to reconcile. However, certain facts are unmistakably clear. The price of a vehicle and weapon that can destroy an enemy vehicle that possesses the potential to deliver a nuclear weapon on the U.S. is cheap relative to the damage which that enemy weapon can inflict upon U.S. The U.S. must have a force in-being that can inflict decisive damage on the complete nuclear delivery capability of the Soviets, and we must convince our enemies of our determination to employ this force if we are to deter them and save this nation from nuclear devastation.

Knowing that our military advantage will be at its lowest ebb if our strategic offensive force sustains serious losses in an initial surprise attack, we must insure that we attain and maintain a force that can prevail even under this possibility.

At the outbreak of hostilities, all heavy bombers will conduct operations from Western Hemisphere bases. Intermediate or forward staging bases, in the



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staging bases, in the Atlantic, United Kingdom, Far East and Africa-Middle East area, will be used as necessary for deep penetration operations. Minimum reliance will be placed on pre-strike staging bases for operations by heavy bombardment aircraft and maximum use will be made of in-flight refueling.


On D-Day a portion of the medium bomb, reconnaissance and tanker force will be engaged in reflex or maneuver operations at overseas installations and will immediately launch sorties from these bases. The balance of the medium bomber, reconnaissance and tanker force will immediately launch sorties from the U.S. utilizing available overseas refueling and operating bases and air refueling as required to provide essential target coverage. After the first strike, that part of the medium bomb, medium reconnaissance and medium tanker force that can be accommodated and utilized at usable overseas bases will be deployed there to continue operations. For planning purposes, it is considered that approximately 5 1/3 medium bomb wings, 2/3 of a reconnaissance wing and 11 tanker squadrons will operate from overseas bases during the initial phase.

The following two charts show the SAC manned bomber force striking from the United States.

(CHART #5 ON)

First, the SAC force is shown attacking representative target areas in central and western Russia and post-strike staging into bases located in the United Kingdom or North Africa. The aircraft are shown departing their home base within 15 minutes after receipt of orders to execute the Emergency War Plan and flying non-stop to targets 5040 and 5400 nautical miles in a total elapsed time as indicated on the chart.

B-52 aircraft from Westover can fly the indicated mission without inflight refueling whereas B=47°s would need to be refueled. With air refueling the B-52°s



refueling the B-52's could return to the United States for post-strike operations. Both types of aircraft operating from Barksdale would require refueling.

(CHART #5 OFF)

(CHART #6 ON)

Sending other portions of the SAC force to representative targets in eastern Russia and post-strike staging into Okinawa or Guam is depicted here.

(CHART #6 OFF)

In addition, B-47's on reflex operations on Guam or Ckinawa could strike targets in 2 hours, those in the United Kingdom would require 3 hours and those in Spain and North Africa would require $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours. All times include the 15 minutes required for dispatching aircraft on alert after receipt of the execution order.

Strategic missile systems will be integrated into the USAF force structure as rapidly as the various systems become operational. The initial strategic missile squadrons will have approximately a 15 minute reaction time. The goal for strategic missile squadrons is to provide a salvo launch capability from hardened, dispersed sites. The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IREM) will be deployed around the Soviet periphery while the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICEM) will be deployed within the continental United States. Intercentinental, subsonic, decay missiles will be deployed in the United States to aid aircraft penetration of periphery defenses. Airborne decays and airconsurface missiles will be utilized to achieve target penetration and destruction.

With regard to the aircraft missile mix we have weighed very carefully the characteristics and capabilities of each weapon system in determining the part that each could play best in accomplishing the strategic offensive task. Our initial studies indicate that 1964 will most likely be the

most likely be the general time period when missile reliability will be sufficiently high to replace a portion of our piloted force. However, it should be noted that there is a certain and constant inflexibility in intercontinental ballistic missile operations. Inflexibility is inherent in the requirement for precise geographical relationships between a missile's launch site and the accuracy of target locations. Inflexibility also exists in the inability to recall a ballistic missile once it is launched, in the inability to divert the missile from one target to another while in flight and in its known trajectory which eases the defense problem. When target values or defensive measures call for a change in strategy or tactics — as they frequently do in war — the attack must be realigned. For this reason, missiles must be complemented by other weapons with a greater degree of flexibility. That other weapon will be a manned weapon system.


Survivability of the manned force is a function of the dispersal, alert status and warning time.

The launch capability for our manned bombers would be improved markedly if we were to receive strategic warning. With 24 hours warning, we can have 80 percent of the bombers in commission and ready for immediate launch. We accomplished this level of readiness in 24 hours during the Lebanon crisis in July.

At the present time we are studying measures we could take to cut down, even further, the time to launch our manned bombers. One measure being studied is the construction of dual runways at SAC bases.

But, the safest place for an airplane is in the air.

An airborne alert force, complete with air-to-surface missiles, is another step which we may take to improve our in-being capability, without embarking upon large, additional expenditures. We have already begun operational tests to determine the best method of maintaining this constant airborne



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this constant airborne alert. The initial results of these tests are encouraging.

Survivability of the missile force is not as closely related to time as the manned force. Under our immediate salvo and MINUTEMAN concepts the entire force could be launched with only tactical warning. But let us assume that we have not launched any of our missiles.

By being in a dispersed and hardened condition, and assuming that the Soviets would have enough missiles to assure them of one arriving in the target area for each missile that we have, and giving him a one nautical mile CEP and a one megaton yield, we would still have 80 percent of our force surviving. And even if the enemy applies five weapons for each of our missiles, our survivability is 30 percent.

We are planning to provide this high degree of survivability in the MINUTEMAN missile concept, which will include dispersal and hardening. The promise that the MINUTEMAN weapon system shows for the future requires that we give it serious consideration.

Immediately on outbreak of general war all Air Defense fighter units will operate on a full 24-hour-a-day basis. All Air National Guard Fighter Interceptor Wings will be integrated into the Continental Air Defense System immediately on D-Day. The fighter interceptor wings will be deployed strategically within the United States on a squadron basis with the objective of intercepting all incoming air attacks at optimum locations for defensive action. On D-Day, fighter interceptor units will be located at bases in Alaska, the Northeast, Atlantic, Europe, North Africa-Middle East and the Far-East Pacific. These units will provide the critical defense interception against Soviet air attacks aimed at the staging bases required in deploying our strategic forces overseas and at the operating bases in the overseas areas.

The Air Force believes

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The Air Force believes that a mixture of defensive weapons must be employed under a defense in depth concept with the goal of engaging the enemy on a continuous basis beginning at the greatest possible distance from the target area. This is mandatory to insure system effectiveness and to prevent destruction from fallout, dead man fuzing and air-tosurface missiles. As the area interceptor missile - POMARC, increases THREAT IS NOW BEING REALIGNED TO INCORPORATE THE ADVANTAGES in reliability and effectiveness, and the electronic environment develops IN THE LONGER RANGE BOMARC B AND MPROVED ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. the capability to operate weapons offectively over wide areas, the air defense force against the air breathing threat will gradually berealigned to incomperate the advantages inherent in longer range intercepter missiles. This realignment will lessen the quantitative requirement for manned interceptors. Also, the requirement for point defense surface-to-air missiles will be reduced to those required at essential areas which warrant "last ditch" effort.


Offensive forces, no matter how powerful, can hardly be considered a deterrent if the enemy, by surprise attack, can destroy them on the ground. The real value of our strategic forces as a deterrent is directly proportional to our ability to protect them. To ensure adequate warning time to SAC bases against the increased threat of missiles and the Mach 2 enemy bomber in the early 1960's, our radar system is being modernized and augmented, and semi-automatic data processing and weapon control systems are being incorporated.

(CHART #7 ON)

First we are modernizing the radar system, guarding the approaches to the North American Continent, programming increased low altitude coverage by 1960 and high altitude coverage - to 100,000 feet - by end 1964.

OVERLAY 1

SAGE comes in this



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SAGE comes in this year with a total U.S. program of 29 Direction Centers and 7 Control Centers by 1964.

OVERLAY 2

The Picket ship coverage is being modernized by the Navy and proposals for increased coverage, including utilization of improved, AEW aircraft, are under consideration.

OVERLAY 3

The NEW Line is now in operation. The extension to the West is through the Alaskan system to the head of the Aleutian Chain, thence out the Aleutian Chain to Umnak Island to Midway.

The DEW Line extension to the East will cross Greenland with 100,000 foot altitude coverage during 1960-61 and the addition of ice cap sites resulting in full coverage during 1961 tying in with the present Iceland air defense system and thence to SACEUR's Early Warning Chain.

The presently operating Argentia-Azores seaward extension of the Mid-Canada Line is planned for re-orientation to cover the Greenland-Azores area when the Navy receives improved AEW equipment.

(CHART #7 OFF)

From D-Day through the Initial Phase, tactical air forces will participate with the strategic forces in the overall strategic offensive. Deployed tactical forces, armed with nuclear weapons, will attack predesignated Soviet targets within the range of tactical aircraft. In addition to participating in the counter-air battle, tactical air units will participate with surface forces as required in containment actions designed to hold and neutralize Soviet surface offensives and destroy deployed Soviet forces. Available tactical air units will participate in all basic types of tactical air operations (air superiority, interdiction and close support).

Tactical missile units

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
Tactical missile units overseas will be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons against the more heavily defended targets, to supplement tactical fighter capability.

In addition to the tactical units deployed in Europe and the Far East on D-Day, tactical forces in the United States will deploy to their predesignated areas as soon as practicable without saturating overseas traffic routes used by strategic combat and support forces. For planning purposes these tactical forces will be deployed within 30 days.

During the Initial Phase, Military Air Transport Service aircraft (including assigned heavy troop carrier units, augmented by Civil Reserve Air Fleet, will be employed throughout the period of hostilities for inter-theater logistic support, critical troop movement, evacuation, and necessary transport for the surface forces. Heavy troop carrier units in Europe and the Far East will provide intra-theater airlift in those areas. Troop carrier assault units deployed in combat theaters will engage in combat airborne assaults as required.

beyond that which can be attained through integration of the Ready Reserve on D-Day. Since the "Force-in-Being" concept denies time to procure and train additional personnel, certain pre-planned, automatic actions have been established upon initiation of hostilities. These actions will provide, in addition to the Reserve Forces, personnel and equipment from civil air carriers. Further, personnel levies are made on commands of lesser priority during the Initial Phase to augment the capability of first priority commands.

Now, let us look at the subsequent phase of operations. In the event that hostilities do not cease after the Initial Phase, provision is made for follow-up



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is made for follow-up actions necessary to exploit the conditions resulting from initial nuclear operations.

(CHART #8 ON)

The objective of this Subsequent Phase will be to further reduce the balance of the Soviet military potential to a degree where there is a complete collapse of organized resistance. Although the duration of this phase of operations is undetermined, it is essential that a cutoff date be established for projecting force tabulations and other detailed planning information in USAF War Plans. Without intending to prejudge its actual duration, the Subsequent Phase is shown as lasting five months. Thus, for planning purposes, the Initial and Subsequent Phase operations are projected for an over-all period of six months.

(CHART #8 OFF)

Air offensive operations in the Subsequent Phase will be a continuation of Initial Phase operations, at reduced nuclear intensity, with the military objectives of achieving further destruction or neutralization of the Soviet Bloc essential war-supporting resources and the final defeat of enemy military forces. Operations in this phase will include continuation of general air supremacy, immobilization of the Soviet LOC's, destruction of deployed forces, neutralization of strategic reserves, and destruction of war-sustaining facilities as necessary. Additional forces consistent with the over-all requirements will be deployed overseas during this phase of operations.

While planning for a general war occurring with little or no warning is the primary USAF concern, it is realized that the United States might achieve a significant degree of mobilization and deployment during periods of heightened tension or limited hostilities preceding general war. The extent of this buildup and deployment prior to D-Day will depend upon the political situation, the area of local hostilities, and the time period involved.

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In summary, I wish to emphasize that the USAF concept in support of Joint mid-range planning envisions a surprise Soviet attack as the gravest threat to the United States. To counter this threat we emphasize in our planning that which will provide the most effective deterrent to this general war contingency. We <u>must</u> - and <u>do</u> - place primary emphasis on providing a ready, reliable force which can be a decisive factor by its ability to strike quickly and surely at the enemy.